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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The Role of Agriculture in Development 
The fundamental economic condition given in development 
literature for growth in agriculture is an adequate capital 
investment. This statement, of course, presupposes the basic 
hypothesis that a developing agriculture is a prerequisite to 
economic growth. Alternatively, it has also been hypothesized 
that is shourd be the industrial sector, as opposed to the 
agricultural sector, which should provide the sufficient con-
dition for take-off into self-sustained economic growth. In 
many countries, the agriculturalist's view of development has, 
more or less, won out. The consequences of such views have 
cul minated into a balanced theory of economic growth. A bal-
anced growth requires that a primitive agricultural economy 
re l ease favor from agriculture for the production of non-
agr icultural goods and that the real income of the sector in-
crease by the availability of inexpensive food. This can be 
attained by the application of technology to agriculture, and 
the transfer of development capital to non-farm sectors, which 
requires a continuous decline in the relative importance of 
agriculture to the national output. 
In most developing countries, planners have had to face 
the dilemma that, because economic resources are by definition 
severely limited, their allocation according to the criterion 
of balance may spread them so thin that they are below certain 
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crucial minimum levels which must be exceeded if productivity 
and income are to be raised in any direction. The conse-
quences have been that very difficult choices have been made 
in development plans, with the major objective being the con-
centration of extremely scarce resources on certain strategic 
investments, which will remove the most restrictive bottle-
necks of the current situation. 
B. Scope of the Study 
The traditional achievement of economic development, for 
Ghana as well as for other emerging nations, is through the 
goals of economic growth, social equity, and price stability. 
The means or mechanisms for achieving these goals have been 
through land tenure institutions and marketing institutions, 
as well as through the use of fiscal policy, monetary policy, 
and incomes policy instruments. Unlike some other developing 
countries, Ghana is relying much more heavily on the agricul-
tural sector as the primary base from which overall economic 
development will be launched. 
Of the means or mechanisms above, the area agricultural 
credit will be the theme of this thesis1 or more specifically, 
the area of agricultural credit to the small-holder--with 
special emphasis on loan repayment problems. The scope, as 
thus stated, of this topic will be adhered to as stringently 
as possible with full knowledge of its part as an integral 
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component in the total Ghanian economy. A more aggregate 
approach will have to be pursued at times but attempts will 
be made to hold this to a minimum, so that a more in depth 
study can be conducted. The primary geographical area of 
consideration is Northern Ghana1 primarily the Northern and 
Upper regions of Ghana. This is the part of Ghana which the 
government officials in Ghana see as the most economically 
productive because of the savanna type geography, thereby 
rendering land clearing operations less of a problem. 
c. Limitations of the Study 
Probably the most serious limitation of this study is 
evidenced by the lack of a quantitative assessment of the 
problem under consideration. The primary reason for this 
deficiency is that the collection of the primary data from 
which the study was originally supposed to be based on, was 
not completed on time. Therefore, the current topic had to be 
opted for the original, and due to the limited primary data 
on the topic at hand, the analysis had to be based on descrip-
tive and qualitative techniques. 
D. Purpose of the Study 
Although a preliminary examination of economic develop-
ment in Ghana revealed several problematic situations in the 
fonn of gaps between the existing situation and the desired 
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goals, several considerations dictated the nature of the 
topic in this study. Probably the aspect which outweighed 
all others was the current strong belief among many govern-
ment officials that much more emphasis, particularly at the 
operational level, needs to be directed toward the small-
holder community. The rather large amounts relegated to the 
agricultural sector in the form of subsidies is evidence of 
sincerity in this direction. This includes subsidized credit, 
guaranteed prices, fertilizer (see Table 1 for average ferti-
lizer subsidy), and improved seeds at 25% subsidy ( J6 , p. 145) . 
Ghanian officials are searching for an operational small-
holder production strategy. This search includes input(s), 
crop(s), price structure, institutional framework, etc. which 
can be tried and which will work. In trying to aid in this 
search, this study is encompassing the topic mentioned above. 
In delving more deeply into the area of agricultural 
credit in Ghana, it was found that a more pressing problem 
facing the development of agriculture in Ghana is the problem 
of loan repayment. A great majority of the reason given for 
the poor loan repayment problems consider only the farm level 
problems. It is the hypotheses of this study that the over 
expansion of agricultural credit (i.e., a governmental or 
agency level controlled variable) should actually be consid-
ered along with the farm level problems. 
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Table 1. Ministry of Agriculture fertilizer subsidy levelsa 
Fertilizer 
15-15-15 (Compound) 
20-20-0 (Compound) 
3-25-18 (Compound) 
Sulfate of Ammonia 
Single Superphosphate 
Triple Superphosphate 
Muriate of Potash 
Urea 
Others 
12-10-10 (Mixture) ) 
Sulfate of Potash ) 
Lime ) 
Kieserite ) 
Average Subsidy 
Subsidy1/£/ 
Level 
(¢) 
13. 70 
11. 71 
NA 
7. 71 
5.56 
11.49 
7. 01 
14.11 
NA 
10.18 
source: Computed from MOA records 
% 
SubsidyJ/ 
83 .0 
80 .7 
NA 
79.4 
74.5 
73.1 
77.8 
70 . 9 
NA 
77 . 34 
Within a radius of up to) miles transport charge 
is ¢3 . 00 per ton (~0.1 5 112-lbs .) 
Within a radius of up to 25 miles transport charge 
is ~5.00 per ton (¢0.25 / 112-lbs .) 
From Terna to Accra is 18 miles and so the charge 
is ~0.25 / 112-lbs. 
Y Excludes the transport charges of 8.5 pesewas per 
mile per ton of fertilizer transported to the region 
JI Proportion of the input price that the farmer does 
not pay. 
~~edified from J6 , p. 145. 
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E. Outline of the Study and Methodology 
Having delimited the area of study, a more detailed look 
at the specific goals, existing situation, and the hypothe-
sized problematic gap of the proposed topic can now be inves-
tigated. Diagnostic hypotheses will then be proposed and 
evaluated via analysis of failure and success elements of the 
institutional technology under consideration. This will, in 
turn, call for remedial hypotheses which will examine the 
elimination of failure elements as defects, and possibly, 
discover and expand success elements as institutional changes. 
Prior to these hypotheses or phases, there will be an intro-
duction to the agricultural characteristics of the Ghanian 
economy, with special emphasis on the Northern and Upper 
regions of Ghana. 
The method of analysis of the problem of loan repayment 
will be the goals-means continuum. A model of the analytic 
technique follows. 
Goals 
A. 
,,,.... 
.... 
B . 
c . 
..... 
Existing~ 
Situations 
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Delimiting Phase or Hypothesis 
1 . Goa 1 s 
2. Existing situation 
3. Problematic Gap (gap between what 
exists & desired goal) 
Diagnostic Phase or Hypothesis 
1. Failure elements (responsible 
for gap between goals sought 
and consequences realized) 
2. Success elements (responsible 
for gap no larger than it is) 
Remedial Phases or Hypothesis 
1. Eliminating failure elements 
as defects 
2. Discover and expand success 
elements as institutional changes. 
~igure 2a. Interrelationship between €Oals , means, and 
consequences (J4, p . 88) . 
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II. AGRICULTURAL POLICY IN GHANA 
The first really "agricultural'' development policy for 
Ghana came with the inauguration of Ghana's third Agricul-
tural Development Plan (1959-1964). Among the objectives 
proposed to develop agriculture, six priorities were stated. 
They were as follows: (1) to raise the yields of the cocoa 
industry; (2) to establish the foundation of the cattle indus-
try; (3) to establish large acreages in rubber and bananas in 
the west and south-west; (4) to raise the yield of cereals in 
the northern region; (5) to bring the Volta flood plain under 
irrigation; (6) to study and promote the use of fertilizers. 
This policy and plan was followed by a period of stagnation 
for the agricultural sector and moreover for the Ghanian 
economy as a whole (32, p. 15). It was not until the early 
seventies that the government, which came to power on Janu-
ary 13, 1972, launched a full-fledged agricultural policy or 
program. This program was known as "Operation Feed Yourself" 
or "OFY'', OFY is a self-reliance policy and was the primary 
base from which the January thirteenth revolution drew its 
support. 
One reason for such policy was the severe internation-
al agricultural dependency as evidenced by the significant 
importation of rice, maize, soya-bean oil, yellow corn, live 
meat products, powdered milk, and industrial inputs. The 
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magnitude of this agricultural dependency is demonstrated by 
Table 2, which is a table of selected agricultural imports 
(most of which could very likely be produced domestically) 
from 1969-1973. 
Another reason for the policy was the strictly agricul-
tural nature of the Ghanian economy. Table 3 gives the rural 
population of Ghana as a proportion of the total population 
as 71% in 1970. The agricultural sector has also made sub-
stantial contributions to Ghana's foreign exchange earnings 
in both absolute and relative terms. As Table 4 indicates, 
agricultural and forestry related products contribute some-
where between 69.1% and 80.3% of Ghana's annual foreign 
exchange over the period of 1969 to 1973. 
A final reason concerns the agricultural output mix. 
From Table 4 it can be seen that cocoa and cocoa products 
are by far the most dominant export crop and consequently is 
the most important foreign exchange earner for Ghana. Of 
course, any program to alleviate an international agricul-
tural dependency in Ghana could not focus on an export crop 
such as cocoa for at least two important reasons. They are 
as followsa (1) Agricultural independence means domestic 
consumption, so what is needed is not more cocoa but more 
import product substitution and (2) The world market for 
cocoa products is dominated by a limited number of wealthy 
countries (see Table 5). There is little scope for expan-
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Table 2. Se l ected agricultural imports 1969-1973 in millionsa 
of cedis 
Live Animals/Meat and Meat 
Preparations 11.9 
Fish and Fish Preparations 4.9 
Sugar, Sugar Preparations 
and Honey 8.5 
Animal and Vege table Oils 5. 9 
Cotton (fibre ) 1. 9 
J ute (fibre) . 8 
Tobacco and Tobacco 
Manufactures . 4 
Total Selected Imports 34,3 
Total Me rchandise Imports 354.4 
Total Selected Imports as % 
of Total Merchandise Imports 9,7 
12.7 
13 , 9 
16,5 
3. 8 
5,4 
1.4 
2. 1 
55 . 8 
419.1 
13.3 
9,8 
11.7 
10.5 
5,3 
4.7 
1.3 
3,1 
46 .4 
443.1 
10.5 
source1 External Trade Statistics of Ghana 
a36, p . 16. 
7.7 
11.8 
14. 2 
5. 2 
7,3 
1 .1 
1.5 
48.8 
381 .7 
12.8 
7, 5 
11.8 
21 .0 
6.o 
12 . 3 
1.8 
2 . 6 
63 . 3 
508.1 
12 . 5 
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Tabl e 3. Regional distribution of the rural populations , 
(OOO ' s) a 
Rural Population Annual % 
as a Proportion Compounded 
to Total (%) Rate of Growth 
Re gion l.22.Q. 
·,'/es tern 476,3 565 . 2 76 74 1. 73 
Central 547 , 8 645 .2 73 72 1. 65 
Eastern 879. 6 946.o 80 75 .73 
Vol ta 674 . o 792 . 8 87 84 1.64 
Ashanti 827 .4 1081 . 8 75 73 2.72 
B/Ahafo 502 . 7 598 , 3 86 78 1. 76 
Nor t he r n 462 . 5 580.0 87 80 2 . 29 
Upper 724 .8 795 . 1 96 93 . 93 
G/Accra 98 .4 99.4 20 12 . 10 
Total 5193 , 5 6103 , 8 77 71 1. 63 
Source: Population Census 1960 and 1970 
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Table 4. Agricultural and forestry r elated exports 1969-1973 
(millions of cedis)a 
12.£2 12.'ZQ 1221. 127.f. 1.2.Zl 
Food and Live Animals 189.6 337.5 228.4 334.J 404.3 
Cocoa and Cocoa Products 185.7 331.7 222.9 328,2 379.3 
Coffee and Coffee Prepara-
tions 1.6 J.2 2.5 J.4 2.9 
Crude Agricultural Materials 40,8 37,7 34.0 65 .2 133.0 
Wood, Lumber, and Cork 39.5 37.4 32.9 63.7 130.6 
Animal and Vegetable Oils 
and Fa ts 0 . 1 0 • 3 0 • 1 0 . 2 0 . 1 
Total of Above 230.2 375.5 262.5 399.7 537 .4 
Total Exports of All Items 333.3 . 467.4 357.5 564.4 7J0.4 
Total Agricultural/Forestry 
Exports as a % of Total 
Exports of All Items 69.1 
Cocoa and Cocoa Products as 
a % of Total Exports of All 
Items 55.7 
80.3 73.4 70.8 
71.0 62 .4 58.2 
sources External Trade Statistics of Ghana 
a J6, p. 1J. 
73.6 
54 .4 
Table 5. World cocoa bean importers, 1969-1974 (metric tons)a 
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
DEVELOPED 837052 893545 952192 971879 917546 865400 
N America 235539 300868 338360 307941 267598 237792 
N Europe 552137 532945 551881 601529 584008 573695 
Oceania 11903 19622 17225 18387 21341 21268 
0th developed 37473 40110 44726 44022 44599 32645 
DEVELOPING 27643 36202 40999 37593 37117 36697 
Africa 1392 1280 1338 2354 2041 2008 
Lat America 18083 22579 28391 20476 21458 22125 
Near East 2745 2883 3258 2883 1922 1845 
Far East 5397 6444 7992 11865 11680 10704 
0th developing 26 16 20 15 16 15 
CENTR PLANI\1D 174642 180705 225757 240591 223551 257738 
Asian cpe 140 802 891 1940 8760 9300 
Europe USSR 174502 179901 224866 238651 214791 248438 
(metric tons) 
~ource: 14, p. 143. 
1Jb 
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
694873 683194 590Ln9 572362 815471 1247023 
178804 214518 192401 162945 226426 336677 
472219 422338 357517 371804 529460 840073 
8576 16033 12215 10323 12650 17590 
35274 30305 28346 27290 46935 52683 
22959 25818 25218 24098 31802 46864 
1319 1027 893 1565 1755 2393 
14285 17083 16616 12652 17265 25530 
2583 2521 1991 1910 1801 2070 
4758 5162 5700 7958 10965 16854 
14 15 18 13 16 17 
150238 146722 140271 146018 194484 364905 
92 474 499 1110 5830 8600 
150156 146248 139772 144908 188654 356305 
(1000$ ) 
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sion in the level of consumption of this commodity in the 
Western European countries and North America. Unless sales 
are found to be possible in the Eastern European countries , 
the demand is not likely to rise. 
Primarily for the above three reasons, commodity import 
substitution in rice, maize, livestock, sugarcane, oil palm, 
and cotton has been stressed. In addition, new emphasis was 
given to yam, cassava, plantainand sorghum production. 
Further emphasis or substantiation for import substitution 
was given as a result of the two problems of the increased 
food import bill, and underemployed domestic resources (see 
Table 2). 
To stimulate and monitor the "OFY" program, the Ministry 
of Agriculture requested regional agricultural officers and 
their staffs to undertake reconnaissance surveys to identify 
the major crop production activities, available lands, phys-
ical input needs, and financial requirements to expand the 
acreages of the major crops produced in the respective 
regions. The staff of the Central Ministry, on the basis 
of the regional crop and acreage reports, then established 
acreage targets for the major food crops on a regional basis. 
The country was divided into major agricultural zones on the 
basis of food crops, and the major crops produced within these 
zones were given priority by the regional extension staffs. 
15 
III. AGRICULTURAL FEATURES OF GHANA 
The Northern and Upper regions of Ghana are a part of 
what is known as the guinean savanna or middle belt, having 
hot tropical climates (see Figure 2). Within this belt, the 
Northern region of Ghana occupies 26,830 square miles and the 
Upper region of Ghana occupies 10,600 square miles. The total 
land area of the two regions is therefore 37,430 square miles. 
About 38% or 14,800 square miles (9,472,000 acres) is consid-
ered fit for cultivation. The characteristic poor physical 
and chemical subsoils is evidenced by the high kaoline con~ent 
of the clays causing leaching, low cation absorbing capacities 
and low nutrient contents. The annual rainfall in the guinean 
savanna belt ranges between forty to fifty inches with a 
single maximum peak in late August and early September. The 
effective dry season extends to five to five and one-half 
months per year. Without irrigation the climate is too dry 
for plantation crops. 
A. Population Characteristics 
The Northern region ranks first in total land area of all 
regions in Ghana (see Table 6). The population density is 
twenty-seven persons per square mile, which is the lowest of 
any region in Ghana. The region ranks eighth in terms of the 
number of agricultural holders and fifth in terms of the total 
16 
Table 6. Total land area of Ghana by regions (square miles)a 
Regions Land Area 
(sq. mi.) 
Ashanti 9,700 
Brong-Ahaf o 14,900 
Central 3,656 
Eastern 8,750 
Northern 27, 122 
Upper 10,478 
Volta 8 , 000 
Western 9.494 
Total 92,100 
source: Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations 
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number of individuals domiciled in agriculture (10% of the 
national total)(J6, p. 196 ). The region has the largest 
median agricultural household size (see Table 7). The prin-
cipal food crops in the Northern region are maize, sorghum, 
millet, rice cassava, yam, g roundnuts, beans, and cowpeas. 
The relative importance of these selected crops is outlined 
in Table 8. 
The Upper region ranks third in terms of the number of 
holders in agriculture and second in terms of the total 
number of people domiciled in agriculture (18% of the nation-
al total). On the basis of the overall population (rur~l and 
urban) the region ranks fourth with 10% of the total popula-
tion. The population density in the Upper region was esti-
mated to be 8.2 persons per square mile in 1970. The region 
ranks second in terms of total cultivated acres, accounting 
for 14% of the total cultivated area ( 36 , p .198). The prin-
cipal crops grown in the Upper region are maize, sorghum, 
millet, rice, cassava, yam, groundnuts, beans and cowpeas. 
The relative importance of these selected crops is outlined 
in Table 9. 
B. Rice Production in Northern Ghana 
Due to the relative position of rice as a topic of 
discussion into various aspects of this crop is necessary. 
Such a discussion follows. 
Table ?. Labor utilization of household members on holdingsa 
by regions 
Region 
Western 
Central 
Eastern 
Volta 
Ashanti 
Brong-Ahaf o 
Northern 
Upper 
Total 
a 36, p. 69. 
Full-time 
OOO's % 
130 35 
148 36 
194 27 
120 21 
215 27 
138 37 
161 44 
255 32 
1362 JO 
Part-time 
OOO's % 
108 29 
134 33 
303 42 
217 39 
332 41 
145 34 
135 31 
272 ':14 ~ 
1645 36.5 
Not at all 
OOO's % 
132 36 
125 31 
216 31 
224 40 
259 32 
143 29 
138 25 
275 44 
1510 33 . 5 
18b 
Total 
Household 
Members 
370 
407 
713 
561 
806 
426 
434 
802 
4517 
% Share of 
Total Rural 
Population 
65 
63 
68 
71 
75 
71 
75 
99 
74 
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Table 8. Northern Re~ion: Relative importance of selected 
crops, 1973 
% Holders in Relative Importance of the Crop 
Region Produ- Holders Acres 1./ Production 
Crop cing Crop ~ Rank ~ Rank ~ Rank 
Maize 90 9 6 14 4 16 3 
Sorghum 90 40 2 20 2 35 2 
Millet 95 38 2 10 2 30 2 
Rice 10 15 2 45 1 54 1 
Cocoayam 
Cassava 38 4 7 1 7 5 7 
Yam 79 24 1 43 1 23 2 
Plantain 
Groundnuts 54 27 2 37 2 25 2 
Beans and 
Cowpeas 19 11 2 28 2 27 2 
Cocoa 
Oil Palm 
Sourcei MOA, Current Agricultural Statistics, 1973 
.!./ Includes crop in pure and mixed predominant 
stands. 
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Table 9. Upper Region: Relative importance of selected 
crops, 1973a 
% Holders in Relative Importance 
Acres 1/ 
of the Crop 
Region Pro- Holders Production 
Crop ducing Crop ~ Rank ~ Rank ~ Rank 
Maize 23 4 8 6 7 6 
Sorghum 72 57 1 77 1 63 
Millet 85 59 1 89 1 70 
Rice 15 39 1 13 J 16 
Cocoyam 
Cassava 3 4 7 neg. 8 neg. 
Yam 7 4 7 7 4 8 
Plantain 
Groundnuts 49 43 1 44 1 70 
Beans and 
Cowpeas 77 85 1 72 1 67 
Cocoa 
Oil Palm 
Source: MOA, Current Agricultural Statistics, 1973. 
1/ Includes crop in pure and mixed predominant 
stands. 
a36, p. 199. 
7 
1 
1 
2 
8 
4 
1 
1 
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Historically rice production in Ghana predominated in the 
Volta region, but since the late 1960's, the Northern region 
has been the major producer along with the Upper region (36, 
p, 94). In the Northern region 10% of the holders in the 
region produce rice (see Table 9). In reference to the rela-
tive national importance of the crop in the region, the 
region ranks second in the number of holders producing rice 
with 15%, it ranks first in the percentage of acres under rice 
production with 46%, it ranks first in the production of rice 
with 54% (see Table 8). 
In the Upper region 15% of the holders in the region 
produce rice. In reference to the relative national impor-
tance of the crop in the region; the region ranks first in the 
number of holders producing rice with 39%; it ranks third in 
the percentage of acres under rice with 13%; it ranks second 
in the production of rice with 16% (see Table 9). 
In looking at the nine most important food crops in agri-
culture and the Ghanian diet, excluding cocoa, rice ranked 
ninth or last in the present contribution to the total value 
of agricultural production (see Table 10). It also ranked 
ninth (last) in the percent of total cultivated acres (see 
Table 10), The figures grossly underestimate the significance 
of rice since this data were collected. A recalculation of 
the figures for these same eight most important food crops 
reveal this new expansion in rice and the increase in its 
22 
Table 10. Relative importance of nine food crops and cocoaa 
in Ghanian agricultural, 1970 
Percent Contribution 
to Total Value Agri- Percent of Total.!/ 
cultural Production Cultivated Acres1 
Plantain 13.3 3,0 
Cocoayam 8.9 1.5 
Yam 8.4 4.6 
Cassava 8.4 4.9 
Maize 3.5 11.3 
Sorghum 2.7 4.4 
Groundnuts 2.2 2.8 
Millet 2.0 6.o 
Rice ~ ~ 
Sub-total 50.8 40.6 
Cocoa ~ ~ 
Total 85.4 95,6 
a 
·source: Adapted from the 1970 Ghanian Sample Census 
of Agriculture and B. I. Rourke, "Rural 
Employment and Labour Productivity in 
Ghana," mimeo. Legon, Ghana, March 1974 • 
.!/ Based upon only main season crop acreage 
and pure stand and dominate crop mixtures 
but not subsidiary mixtures, 
N.B. The relative importance of rice is under-
stated in this table because of the large 
acreage expansion and increased yield which 
have occurrerlsince 1970. Today, rice prob-
ably follows maize in relative importance. 
J6 t p. 84. 
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relative importance (see Tables 8 and 9, 1973 data). The 
reason for this recent expansion in rice can be attributed 
to the fact that rice is the major crop in which the govern-
ment of Ghana has embarked on an import substitution cam-
paign. This is interesting, since the economic costs of 
present and expanded production are higher for rice than for 
any other food crop produced in Ghana (see Table 11). Other 
considerations outweighed this fact in the government 's 
decision. For instance, imports of rice to Ghana the previ-
ous years have been approximately J0,000 tons per year. 
This represents an investment in foreign exchange and future 
years amounting to roughly $4 ,500,000 per year. Meanwhile, 
rice consumption in Ghana is rising at a rate of approxi-
mately ten per cent per year as population increases and 
rice becomes more popular as a part of the diet (J S, p . 1). 
The rice industry in Ghana has been heavily favored. A 
very large proportion of the fertilizer used in Ghana has been 
allocated to the Northern region and has been increasingly 
subsidized in recent years. Table 12 shows the regional dis-
tribution of fertilizer by type. Supplies of sulphate of 
ammonia, 15-15-15 fertilizer and 20-20-20 fertilizer (each of 
which is recommended by the Ghanian Ministry of Agriculture 
for rice) heavily favor the Northern and Upper regions . In 
addition, a major effort of the Seed Multiplication Unit of 
the Ministry of Agriculture is located in the Northern region. 
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Table 11, Potential gross output per unit of inputa 
Crop 
Maize 
Groundnut 
Rice 
Tobacco 
Cotton 
Vegetables 
Gross Out-
put/ Acre 
(shillings) 
920 
975 
800 
1200 
1000 
3200 
as ourc e 1 16, p. 2 • 
Input/Acre 
(excluding labor) 
(shillings) 
130 
116 
348 
208 
102 
1010 
Output/Unit 
of Input 
7.1 
8,6 
2,3 
5 , 8 
9.8 
J.2 
Table 12. Ministry of agricultural regional fertilizer 
distribution, 1973 (quantity in tons)a 
Sulphate 
Region of Ammonia 12-15-15 20-20- 0 
Eastern 178 1,550 250 
Greater Accra 414 2,051 JOO 
Central J48 676 126 
Western 100 250 20.5 
Ashanti 8JO 1, 926 178 
Brong-Ahaf o 92 500 175 
Volta 245 676 . 5 118 
Northern J ,763 4,500 1,900 
Upper 2 ,1 30 2·, 149 J50 
Ghana Tobacco 
Co. 
Source a MOA Records 
aJ6 , p . 139 . 
Single 
Superphosphate 
JO 
20 
800 
650 
2 5b 
Triple 
Superphosphate Muriate 
50 
50 25 
50 45 
100 100 
50 JO 
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c. Farming Systems 
Three farming systems& shifting cultivation, compound 
farming, and irrigated gardens, are found within the area, 
though the extent to which each is practiced varies from 
place to place. In the Upper region conditions are somewhat 
more settled. Fallows are shorter, and compound farming is 
widely practiced because of the density of the population. 
Under the system of shifting cultivation, a piece of 
land is cleared of bush growth and is kept under crops for 
a period of four to six years, after which it is allowed to 
remain fallow and get covered again with natural growth of 
grass , shrubs and trees. During this period another piece 
of land is cleared and crops are grown on that area. 
Compound farming is carried out on a small piece of 
land, adjoining the village settlement or site, and more or 
less permanently cultivated by a farming family. The small 
area, or compound, is wholly or partially manured with cattle 
dung to grow rather high value crops like tobacco, chilies 
and even some vegetables under rainfed conditions. To the 
extent that the small piece of land is neither a hut area nor 
enclosed by a wall or fence, the local term compound farming 
is misleading. In addition to such areas each farming family 
has, at some distance from the settlement, an area under 
shifting cultivation for growing such crops as guinea corn, 
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millets and pulses. 
The irrigated gardens are also small areas, used by the 
individual farmers, in addition to land under rainfed crops, 
to grow vegetables under irrigation, whereever suitable water 
is available in the dry season . Such gardens are f ound in 
large numbers in northern Ghana , even where only a limited 
amount of water is available, such as from wells or dugout 
holes in stream beds. These gardens have also sprung up near 
the small darns built by the government for water supply. Usu-
ally, water is carried in buckets from its source, and it is 
applied by sprinkling over the plants. 
D. Land Capability 
A broad division of the arable land into upland and l ow-
land can be made. The uplands have soils mos tly medium to 
light and easy to cultivate, which can support a variety of 
crops, like guinea corn, millets, pulses, cotton, groundnut, 
etcetera. The main drawbacks of some of these soils are their 
shallow depth, the susceptibility to erosion, their low fertil-
ity, and the presence of concretionary sub-soil or iron-pan. 
The lowland on the other hand had heavy, fertile soils, diffi-
cult to cultivate with manual labor and oftentimes problem-
atic, especially in or along the depressed , narrow, seasonally 
water-logged valleys, flanked by country which is uninhabited 
beca use river-borne insects can be contracted there. With 
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drainage and mechanical cultivation these soils could produce 
an excellent rice crop. The agronomist has suggested that 
cotton should be grown on deep, well-drained, medium to heavy 
soils, rice in poorly drained heavy lowland soils, maize in 
well-drained medium textured soils, tobacco on medium heavy 
soils, groundnut on coarse sandy soils and pulses on medium 
silt loams. 
E. Traditional Forms of Land Tenure 
The predominant form of property in northern Ghana is 
patrilineal. Land is owned by the community which allocates 
use rights to its families. In a patrilineal society, a 
deceased's use rights will be given to his or her children. 
Fragmentation is not likely to be more pronounced in areas 
cultivated by patrilineal societies as opposed to matrilineal 
society a deceased's right's are given to the children of his 
or her children, all of whom generally have a greater number 
of children than the deceased. There is a marked correlation 
between degree of commercialization and proportion of holdings 
reporting freehold tenure by region. The proportion of 
samples reporting communal tenure in the Upper and Northern 
regions, where opportunities for cocoa and commercial food 
production have historically been less favorable, were sev-
enty-three per cent and 100% respectively as opposed to sev-
enty-three, sixty-six, and fifty-six per cent respectively 
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in the Eastern, Ashanti and Central region, where cocoa is 
the major cash crop (37, p. 9). 
/ 
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IV. AGRICULTURAL CREDIT IN GHANA 
A. Review of Agricultural Credit in Ghana 
The first attempt at establishing a successful institu-
tional agricultural credit program in Ghana started with the 
granting of credits by cocoa co-operatives during the cocoa 
season of 1931-1932. Although this venture was said to have 
been successful, later programs met with limited success, 
thereby leaving the bulk of the agricultural credit in Ghana 
to be provided almost entirely by relatives, friends and 
money lenders. In April 1964, the Bank of Ghana established 
a Rural Credit Department to study the problems of agricul-
tural credit and prepare the necessary legislation, plans and 
procedures for the establishment of an agricultural credit 
bank. In April of the following year, Parliament passed an 
act (Act 286) to incorporate the Agricultural Credit and Co-
operative Bank. The new bank started its operations in 
August 1965, taking over the assets and liabilities of the 
Rural Credit Department of the Bank of Ghana. Two years 
later, the initial act was amended by a decree of the National 
Libera ti on Council (Decr.ee 182) and the bank• s name was 
changed to the Agricultural Development Bank (ADB)~the prin-
cipal source of short term agricultural credit in Ghana today . 
(see Table 13). (Because the ADB is the principal source of 
small farmer credit in Ghana, it will be its' efforts which 
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Table 13. Loans and advances to the agricultural sectora 
1969-1973 (1,000 Cedis) 
S 0 U R C E 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
Commercial 
Banks 10,000 9,048 16' 154 16,048 17,300 
National 
Investment 
Bank 769 692 3,433 7,583 4,112 
Agricultural 
Development 
4,530 8,622 28,469 Bank 3,070 17,823 
Total 13,839 14,270 20,209 52,100 39,239 
aModified froms 21, p. 2. 
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will play the major role in this study. In analyzing its' 
programs, we will then be actually analyzing the small farmer 
credit problems of Ghana.) 
With the establishment of a institution whose sole 
purpose was the providing of agricultural credit, it was 
believed that Ghana's agricul tural credit problems would be 
settled over night, This was not the case, primarily because 
the ADB's attempt to establish a sound agricultural credit 
program was not coordinated or did not coincide with an over-
all agricultural development policy for the country of Ghana 
as a whole. (The ADB started its operations in 1965, while 
the first authentic agricultural development policy did not 
start until early seventies.) Some coordination did come with 
the conception of "Operation Feed Yourself" in the early sev-
enties, but there was some misdirection in the desired goals. 
In considering credit as an input in relation to the 
agricultural entrepreneur, there was apparently, initial 
stages of OFY, less consideration given to the issue of 
credit, even though all of the inputs of agricultural produc-
tion required some sort of cash outlay~either on the part of 
the government, the farmers themselves, or a combination of 
the two. One rational for this policy follows. 
Despite the initial reliance on the small-scale farmer 
to increase food production, increasing emphasis was placed 
on larger f a rms which use relatively capital intens ive produc-
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tion systems in certain areas of the country, and in the 
production of certain crops. There was little need for a 
governmental agricultural credit policy because these large 
scale enterprises could deal directly with the local commer-
cial banks. In observing the apparent discrepancy between 
actual practice (i.e. the ever increasing tendency toward 
large scale producer lending) and the initial emphasis (the 
small-scale farmer); policy makers have now shifted from 
large-scale, capital intensive, public corporation units to 
small-scale farmers. 
B. Features of the Commodity Group Credit Scheme 
Having shifted the emphasis of its development policy to 
the small farmer, the ADB which is the principal source of 
agricultural credit in Ghana, turned to the task of establish-
ing a mechanism or mechanisms whereby the goal of an optimal 
small farmer credit program could be achieved. In considering 
the small-scale nature of the Ghanian economy, which can be 
seen from Table 14, the result was the Commodity Group Credit 
Scheme (CGCS). 
Formally the CGCS was designed to achieve the following 
objectives (4, p. 15)1 
1 . To modify and liberalize ADB lending procedures 
so as to make credit facilities more accessible to 
large numbers of small-scale farmers in the country 
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Table 14. Distribution of size of holding and the number ofa 
holdings relative to cultivated area 
Size of Holding Cumulative Percentage Cumulative % 
(Acres) of Farms of Land 
0 1.9 31 4 
2.0 3,9 55 10 
4.0 5,9 68 18 
6.o 7.9 77 26 
8.0 9.9 82 32 
10.0 - 14. 9 89 43 
15.0 - 19,9 93 52 
20,0 - 29,9 96 63 
30.0 - 49.9 98 74 
50.0 or more 100 100 
·source: Adapted from the Ghana Sample Census of 
Agriculture 1970. 
Area 
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2. To step up production of staple food items 
namely, maize, rice, yam, cassava, shallots, and 
some industrial crops, such as, tobacco, cotton 
and ginger 
J. To increase farm income of the small-scale 
farmer and thereby improve upon his standard of 
living 
4. To introduce gradually among these farmers 
the use of modern technology and up-to-date 
cultural practices in the production of food 
and cash crops. 
In the actual application procedure for a loan by a 
group, the first step is for the group of farmers to join 
together and decide upon their acreage (with the requirement 
that each have at least six acres). The group then applies 
for a loan either directly or through the district crop 
production officer. If the district officer is involved, 
he passes the data on to the nearest ADB office with his 
comments. In either case, upon receipt of the application, 
the ADB representative scrutinizes the loan with respect to 
the conditions in the loan agreement. If everything is in 
order the bank officer approves the loan. Whether the bank 
approves the loan or not, the officer then must let the crop 
production officer and the group know the status of the appli-
cation. The bank officer will convey the decision to the 
group either by letter or word of mouth, whichever is most 
convenient and feasible. If the bank approves the loan, then 
the next step is for the bank officer to examine the area of 
the group before making the first disbursement (which is after 
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the land is cleared and prepared for planting). After 
checking the area prepared, if everything is acceptable the 
officer prepares the disbursement form and fixes a date for 
the group to come pick up their check. The location of dis-
bursement of the checks is always in a town with commercial 
banking facilities so that the checks can be cashed. With 
respect to the actual disbursement all members of the group 
must come and pick up their separate checks. 
The second disbursement of the cash loan is after the 
second weeding but before harvesting. Once again, the ADB 
must first visit every group member's farm to ensure that the 
correct acreage has been planted and cared for. Once the 
acreage has been verified the same procedure as before is 
followed. If in checking the acreage of the farmers in the 
group, the ADB officer finds that the acreage of any member 
at the time of the second disbursement is not the same as that 
of the first disbursement, then the second payment is only for 
the reduced acreage of the member. 
In the general loan application, the ADB collects data 
on; where the farm(s) are located, the acreage, whether free-
hold or leasehold, who manages the farm, the amounts owned and 
to whom, the purpose and amount of the loan as well as total 
cost of the project, sources of additional capital needed and 
security offered for loan and finally the particulars of the 
marketing of produce. This information is then used to eval-
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uate lender asset availability and prior indebtedness. The 
loan officers at the Farm Credit Service Offices or the local 
ADB branch are responsible for repayment. If a loan becomes 
delinquent by more than six months, a penalty interest rate 
of 10% becomes applicable, and if no response is received 
from the client concerning the arrears, the case is sent on 
to the ADB's legal section in the head office in Accra. If 
a loan falls due and the client is unable to pay and no dis-
honesty on the part of the client is apparent, the loan is 
rescheduled at the usual interest rates (21, p. 2J). 
c. Success vs. Failure Elements 
1. Government or agency level vs. farm level 
Of the objectives of CGCS listed above, the ones consid-
ered most important by the ADB were the liberalizing of loan 
making with the view of reaching the broad masses of farmers 
and also the objective of helping the small-scale farmer to 
step-up food production in Ghana. Actually the ADB looked on 
the group lending scheme more as an operational cost-saving 
device. The bank rationalized that by using the group credit 
scheme, the high cost of granting loans on an individual basis 
to large numbers of small farmers would be considerably 
reduced. It was further rationalized that without such a 
device as the group credit scheme, the cost of appraisal 
studies, loan servicing, supervision and collection would have 
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otherwise been very high (4, p. 15). 
If the initial objectives of the CGCS are taken as goals , 
it could legitimately be said that the CGCS is a success. 
These objectives do not represent the ultimate goal unfortu-
nately , since the ultimate goal is a sound agricultural credit 
program for Ghana. The idea of a group scheme for credit 
application was rationally conceived, and it is doubtful that 
a predominantly small farmer economy such as Ghana could 
have an effective small farmer credit program without such a 
mechanism. This is primarily because of the fact that the 
obtainment of personal collateral would be extremely difficult 
for the average small-scale farmer in Ghana. So the CGCS has 
been successful in the objective of extending credit to a 
larger number of small-scale farmers and it appears that 
operational costs were in fact reduced with the adoption of 
the group credit scheme for the small-scale farmer in Ghana . 
However, because of the liberalization of loan procedures, 
the problem of high delinquency rates on loans were magnified. 
In its annual reports in 1972 and 1974, the ADB made special 
mention of the poor repayment performance of its customers. 
The following reasons were giveni 
1. Frequent shortage of basic inputs and equipment 
2. Unfavorable weather conditions resulting in 
insufficient production and hence insufficient 
revenue to pay their loans on schedule 
3. Inadequate marketing avenues and arrangements 
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4. Public attitude to repayment of loans from 
government and credit agencies~credit is 
regarded as government money not meant to be 
paid back. 
All of these reasons are sound but in actuality they are 
very limited in scope because they primarily look at the prob-
lems at the lowest level (i.e. the farm level). Very little 
literature can be found on the analysis of externalities at 
the agency (i.e. the ADB itself) or at the governmental level, 
So in trying to further investigate and identify any failure 
elements, I will proceed back to the initial objectives set 
forth for the CGCS. The objective of modifying and liberal-
izing ADB lending procedures so as to make credit facilities 
more accessible to the large numbers of small-scale farmers in 
the country will be looked at primarily. The initial objec-
tives will be referred to because they follow the actual 
granting of credit. 
2. Literature review of agricultural credit with special 
emphasis on loan repayment problems 
An attempt on the part of a government in a developing 
country to increase the size of its borrower clientele can in 
some respects be likened unto the decision to increase produc-
tion made by the individual firm. The good and the bad 
effects of an increased extension of credit can be labeled as 
economies and diseconomies of scale respectively. Unfortu-
na.telythough, owing to the inherent differences between the 
/ 
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financial industries involved with industrial versus agricul-
tural production, the use of the theory of the firm cannot 
be made explicitly. Belshaw points out that fundamentally, 
credit plays the same part in farming as it does in other 
industries. The differences which separate agricultural from 
other forms of credit, are differences in degree rather than 
in kind. The differences in degree are so great, however, as 
to warrant special study. These differences depend mainly 
upon the characteristics of production and organization in 
farming (7, p. 57). Belshaw further enumerates these differ-
ences ass (1) the complexity of structure and wide variety 
in organization and methods, (2) the unit of agricultural 
production with reference to size and number of the economic 
unit, the division of labor and the use of machinery, (J) the 
lack of specialization, (4) difficulties of combination in 
agriculture which raise barriers to corporate effort, and 
lastly (5) the risk and uncertainty due to changing conditions 
of supply and demand which cannot be foreseen ( 7, p. 57). 
To complicate the problem of analysis even more, discus-
sions on the subject of agricultural credit and agricultural 
development in general , have tended to note the general inap-
plicability of a generalized theory expounded on an overall 
country basis. Johnston and Mellor have pointed out that 
diversity among nations and the variety that is so character-
istic of agriculture inevitably limit the validity of a 
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condensed, general statement (23, p. 590). Discussions have 
also emphasized and consequently recognized the inherent 
differences between economic applications in industrialized 
versus developed countries . Reports of the experimentation 
in agriculture is extremely difficult and costly, and only 
rarely successful (1J, p. 1) with reference to the area of 
agricultural credit, the transfer of knowledge and technology 
has usually meant the requirement of collateral as security 
for loans. Generally, apart from land and only in the area 
occupying owners, the peasants' tangible assets are few and 
the use of land for security is often beset with other diff i-
culties. The importance which the farmer attaches to econom-
ic security and the perpetuation of the family may make him 
reluctant to pledge it except under duress, such as may result 
from personal misfortune or social pressure to incur ceremo-
nial expenditure. But, in addition, the title to land may not 
be clear or there may be a number of owners of fragmented 
pieces (6, p. 31). 
What planners and development economists have tended 
toward in investigating the problems of agricultural credit, 
especially the problem of loan repayment rates, is the use of 
case studies or individual observation as one methodology for 
investigating problems of agricultural credit. Fortunately, 
these observations have uncovered some guidelines on the 
effects and causes of poor loan collection performance in 
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in developing countries, One such observation has been that 
loan collection performance tends to vary inversely with the 
range of access effectively achieved by a rural credit 
scheme (27, p, 50), One rational given for this phenomenon is 
that assuming other things equal and viewed from the long-run 
perspective, lenders who are very selective and serve only 
those farmers who are better able to repay loans, tend to 
achieve better collection results than other lenders who offer 
credit to a much larger proportion of rural people than could 
meet the conventional standards, Collection performance dete-
riorates as credit standards are lowered. Yet only by lower-
ing credit standards is it possible to lend to larger propor-
tions of the rural population, Rural development tends to be 
viewed by the development profession as inherently involving 
broadly based measures which will inable large segments of the 
rural population to progress. Thus, public sector credit 
schemes tend to cast their net widely, aiming at including as 
many rural people as possible, This manifestation of pol i ti-
cal concern for access and equity conflicts with the financial 
logic of credit (39, p. J), The financial logic of credit is 
synonymous with the adoption of a profit motive in borrowing 
and lending operations of a financial institution, If a finan-
cial institution is to adhere to the financial logic of credit 
it must be certain that it adheres to certain practices , It 
must correctly estimate the interest rate as the price which 
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it charges for the use of its• funds. This interest charge 
should allow for such things as various types of risk, uncer-
tainty in business operations, borrower integrity and the 
nature of security (7, p. 34), 
Even though the above analysis in applying such phrases 
as "other things equal" and "the financial logic of credit," 
make the above analysis sound very much like the type of 
analysis which was brought forth in the early stages of the 
formulation of economic development policy, the analysis 
itself is useful in that it points to the planning level for 
the causes of loan repayment problems. One of the main con-
clusions reached by an FAO agricultural credit study in 1965, 
was that one of the main reasons why so many projects aimed 
at strengthening the agricultural credit structure have 
yielded inadequate results or failed completely is, undoubt-
edly, a prevailing tendency to overlook a number of precon-
ditions in the economic, social, political, psychological, 
and cultural fields (17, p, 9). In employing the analysis 
of loan repayment problems listed above as a hypothesis, this 
study will attempt to objectively analyze the planning level 
agricultural credit institution in Ghana, This institution is 
the Agricultural Development Bank of Ghana. 
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3. Analysis of the problem (agency level) 
a. Relationship of loans approved, loans outstanding, 
profits, percent loan repayment rates and percent short-term 
investment over time of the ADB of Ghana A quantitative 
look at the five variables of loans approved, loans outstand-
ing, profits, percent loan repayment rates and percent short-
term investment, over time, of the ADB of Ghana, appears in 
Table 15 and is graphically represented in Figures 3 through 
seven. A matrix of the correlation coefficients of five 
variables listed in Table 15 apprears in Table 16. In looking 
at the operational strategy employed by the ADB over the years 
during 1969 through 1974, it appears that throughout that 
period, the major preoccupation of the ADB was the expansion 
of credit access. Since this objective seemed to be the 
recurrent preoccupation, an attempt will be made to analyze 
the variable loans approved along with loans outstanding, 
percent short- term investment, percent loan repayment, and 
profits. The correlation over time of loans approved and 
loans outstanding for the ADB was .6353 (see Table 16). The 
two variables moved almost parallel over the period of 1969 
through 19710 with a slightly more rapid increase in loans 
outstanding during 1971 (see Figure 4). The more rapid 
increase in the loans outstanding during 1971 is also evi-
denced indirectly by the increase in the percent loan repay-
ment for the year. The years 1972 to 1973 saw the volume of 
loans outstanding grow at a sustained rate for each 
Table 15. Loans approved, loans outstanding, profits and percent loan 
repayment - Agricultural Development Bank of Ghana (1969-74) 
(volume in cedis)a 
Year 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
Loans 
Approvedt 
3,0170,117 
4,529,775 
8,622,441 
Profitsb 
208,700 
198,500 
419,335 
28,468,712 632,033 
17,823,281 932,656 
14,661,122 393 , 916 
asources ADB Records. 
Loans Out-
standing 
3,568,788 
6,159,786 
10,996,626 
24,277,750 
38,323,400 
43,506,528 
Percentc 
Repayment 
.860 
.735 
.784 
.853 
.465 
.337 
Loans 
Approved 
t - 1 
1,215,091 
3,070,117 
4,529,775 
8,622,441 
28,468,712 
17,823,281 
Percent 
Short-term 
Investment 
12.5 
9.7 
18.0 
37.0 
38.0 
40.0 
bprofit is taken here as a measure of loan recovery performance 
because of the method of profit computation used by the ADB. 
Profit and loss accounts reflect interest accrued but not paid. 
c 
Percent Repaymentt= Loans Outstandingt/Loans Approvedt, where 
t= 1969-1974 . 
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Table 16. Pearson correlation coefficients 
PROFITS 
PROFITS 1.0000 0.6714 -0.3689 o. 7297 0.7503 
( 0) ( 6) ( 6) ( 6) ( 6) 
S=o.001e S=0.072 S=0.236 S=0.050 S=0,043 
LO 0.6714 1.0000 -0.8535 0.6353 0.9428 
( 6) ( 0) ( 6) ( 6) ( 6) 
S=0.072 S=0.001 S=0.015 S=0.088 S=0.002 
PR -0.3689 -0.8535 1.0000 -0.1576 -0.6315 
( 6) ( 6) ( 0) ( 6) ( 6) 
S=0,236 S=0.015 S=0.001 S=0.383 S=0.089 
LA 0.7297 0 .6353 -0.1576 1.0000 0.8395 
( 6) ( 6) ( 6) ( 0) ( 6) 
S=0.050 S=0.088 S=0.383 S=0.001 S=0.018 
PSTI 0.7503 0.9428 -0.6315 0.8395 1.0000 
( 6) ( 6) ( 6) ( 6) ( 0) 
S=0.04J S=0.002 S=0.089 S=0.018 S=0.001 
a Lo = Loans Outstanding. 
bPR = Percent Loan Repayment . 
CLA = Loans Approved. 
dPSTI = Percent Short-term Investment. 
eThe S under each coefficient is the one-tailed signif i-
cance. 
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of the yearly periods of 1972 and 1973. The volume of loans 
approved on the other hand, increased more sharply than the 
volume of loans outstanding in 1972 but underwent a rather 
drastic decrease in the year 1973. This phenomenon caused the 
percent loan repayment for 1972 to proceed at about the same 
rate in 1972 as it had in 1971, but in 1973 the percent loan 
repayment figure underwent a drastic decline. The last year 
under consideration, the year 1974, saw a repeat of the same 
basic phenomenon; loans outstanding increased but at a de-
creased rate; percent loan repayment decreased but at a de-
creased rate; loans approved decreased but at a decreased rate. 
The correlation coefficient given by Table 16 for percent 
short-term investment and loans approved over time was .8395 
for the period 1969 through 1974. From 1969 through 1971, the 
yearly growth in loans approved was nearly constant (see 
Figure 6). In looking at the figures for percent short-term 
investment for the same period, there was a decrease in short-
term investment in 1970, but in 1971 there was an increase. 
The year 1972 saw an almost equal increase in both short-term 
investment and loans approved, but the period 1973 through 1974 
saw the rate of growth of short-term investment slacken, but 
remain positive, while the rates of growth for loans approved 
took a relatively sharper decline, with the larger increase 
coming in 1973. 
Table 16 gives a correlation coefficient of . 7297 for 
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profits and loans approved (see Figure 3). After undergoing 
a slight decline in 1970, profits continued at a rather 
steady rate of growth during 1971 through 1972. During the 
same period, loans approved sustained a rather steady rate 
of growth over the period of 1970 through 1971, growing at a 
slower rate than profits in 1971, but growing at a much faster 
rate in 1972. While loans approved took a sharp decline in 
the year 1973, profits accelerated its growth during the 
period, but took the most drastic fall of any variable of any 
period under consideration, including its own. Loans approved 
continued to decline during 1974 but at a slower pace. 
b. Summary of the relationship of loans approved with 
loans outstanding, percent short-term investment, and profits 
In analyzing the graphical representation of the above vari -
ables in other countries, the period 1969 to 1972 appears to 
be the most relevant (see Figure 7). The relevancy comes 
from the fact that this is the period over which there was a 
continual increase in the money volume of loans approved. 
The year 1972 witnessed the greatest increase of the four 
year period. The year 1972 also happened to be the year in 
which there was a change in the government of Ghana. With 
the change in government the import substitution program 
known as "Operation Feed Yourself" also came into being. 
One of the major areas of emphasis was the small-scale farmer. 
This is evidenced by the most drastic increase in short-term 
investment of any year of the period under consideration. If 
the situation of Ghana is characteristic of observations else-
where, we would expect a noticeable increase in loan delin-
quency in the following years. Even though there was no quan-
titative measure of loan delinquency available, the ADB in its 
annual report for 1972 made mention of the increasing problem 
with loan recovery. The reasons given for this increase rate 
of loan delinquency werea (1) frequent shortages of basic 
inputs and equipment, (2) unfavorable weather conditions, 
and (3) inadequate marketing arrangements (1, p, 24). 
The bank in 1973 responded with a decrease in the money 
volume of loans approved. Surprisingly, the reduction of the 
granting of loans was to the corporate sector and not the 
small-scale sector. The bank, in its 1973 report , subsequent-
ly named the agricultural corporate sector as the area in which 
loan delinquency was the greatest problem (2, p, 10). Cons e-
quently, the amounts relegated to short-term investment contin-
ued to increase in the years 1973 and 1974, but at levels con-
sistent with the pre-1972 period. Again in 1974, the ADB in 
its annual report made mention of the problem of loan recovery 
(3, p , 20) , To insure high recovery rates in the ensuing year, 
the bank established a Loans Recovery Division to deal solely 
with defaulting customers. 
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4. Conclusion of the graphical relationship of loans approved 
and loan deliguency 
Before the conclusion from the foregoing analysis is 
presented, certain ideas concerning the connection of theory 
and measurement should be clarified. By and large, three 
unavoidable difficulties may be said to justify a heal t hy 
skepticism regarding the reliability of empirical results. 
I refer specifically to the fact that all empirical work is 
tainted with each of the following errors : errors of measure-
ment, sampling errors, and errors of specification (25, p. JJi 
Accordingly, a current U.S. Civil Service job classification 
handbook describes statistics as "the science of the collec-
tion, classification, and measured evaluation of the facts as 
a basis for inference (11, p, 5). 
Probably one of the more important key words in the above 
definition of statistics is the word inference. Inferential 
(inductive) reasoning is a process of using a limited set of 
supposed facts to make a series of inferences about a univer-
sal concept. The inferences one might draw may be many, some 
nearly right but others very wrong, For this reason, induc-
tive logic is never quite valid. By limiting itself only to 
available facts, it inevitably ignores some amount of conceiv-
ably relevant imformation (25, p, 5), With these ideas in 
mind , I proceed with the conclusion from my analysis. 
The conclusion reached by the graphical analysis is con-
sistent with observations and case studies in other develop-
ment situations. As the volume of loan expansion increased 
and more small-scale loans were approved, the problem of loan 
recovery became pronounced. Even though the staff of the ADB 
mentioned several times in its annual reports, a knowledge of 
the problems contingent with financing agriculture in a devel-
oping economy, planning was not considered to be one of those 
variables. 
Because of the current importance attached to the problem 
of loan recovery in Ghana, as evidenced by a recent workshop 
on loan repayment at Kurnasi, Ghana, it is evident that the 
effor.ts of the ADB's Loan Recovery Division were not as sue-
cessful as anticipated. Upon examining the conference, it 
was noted that there was very little indigenous mention of an 
examination of an administrative or operational cause of loan 
repayment problems in Ghana . Most of the causes were farm 
level in nature. In noting this, an investigation was made 
of the operational structure of loan disbursement and retriev-
al of the ADB, with the Northern and Upper regions of Ghana as 
the major areas of consideration. 
5. Evaluation of the agricultural credit system of the ADB 
Belshaw points out certain goals which an agricultural 
credit system should aim to satisfy (?, p. 83). They are: 
1. Credit should be equally available on comparable 
terms in different areas and for different classes of 
borrowers 
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2. The cost of credit should be as cheap as practicable 
J. Risk should be reduced, as far as practi cable , to 
the borrower, to the credit institution, and to the 
lender 
4. The timing of l oans , amount, considerations of 
repayment, and other terms should be suited to the 
convenience of the borrower 
5. The equity of the farmer must be conserved. 
In the context of the above optimal criterion for an 
agricultural c redit institution, the ADB and its associated 
policies and programs will be examined. 
a. Equal availability of credit Geogra phic expansion 
has been a recurrent objective throughout the history of the 
ADB. The expansion has reached the point of having at leas t 
one ADB branch in each region of the country. But due to the 
size of the reg ions such as the Northern and Upper regions, 
many farmers who live i n the more remote areas, find it dif-
ficult to make use of the ADB's lending objectives and began 
to put more emphasis of the small- scale producer. Most of 
the thrust has been through the Commodity Group Credit 
Scheme, the features of which have been detailed above . 
b. The cost of credit A second aim of good agricul-
tural credit system is that the cost of credit should be as 
cheap as possible. The cost of credit, as defined by the in-
terest rate, has four main parts . They are: (1) a pure rate 
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of interest , (2) the cost of marketing and management of the 
credit enterprise, (3) a cost for risk and uncertainty, 
and (4) a monopoly element, in many cases, due to conditions 
of imperfect competition. The problem with the ADB's cost 
of credit was not that it was too high. From 1972 until 
recently, the rate of interest charged on agricultural loans 
given by the ADB, was pegged at six percent. This did not in 
any way take into consideration the part of the interest rate 
which allows for the inflation responsive cost of marketing 
and management functions of the ADB. Recent acknowledgement 
of this has prompted the raising of the interest rate charged 
on agricultural loans to 8. 5 percent. It is hereby hoped t hat 
this will bring the cost of credit in line with actual expen-
ditures . 
c . Reduction of risks Risk is said to be of mainly of 
four types. They are; natural causes as risks, technical 
risks in areas of marketing , transport, t~chnical inputs, and 
extension, commercial risks in the form of price fluctuations, 
and financial risks . Risk is also a main part of the cost of 
credit. Efforts on the part of the ADB to reduce risk have 
mainly aimed at the reduction of technical and commercial 
risks. Measures to reduce technical risks have been in the 
area of technical inputs in the form of improved seeds and 
fertilizer, but efforts at improving the extension staff have 
also been made, Measures to reduce commercial risk have 
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mainly concentrated on the guaranteeing or fixing of minimum 
prices by the government. Due to the nature of small scale 
agriculture, the pooling of risk through the use of the 
Commodity Group Credit Schemes, has also helped to reduce 
risk to the ADB. 
6. Evaluation of the loanmaking procedures employed by the 
ADB 
a. Timely disbursement of loans and collection The 
nature of the farming activities of most of the crops ob-
served in northern Ghana was annual. One would therefore 
expect that there would be an objective to fix the times of 
repayment and loan disbursal at the time when it is most 
appropriate to the producer; i.e. on an annual basis. This 
means that the yearly farming cycle must be coordinated with 
the appropriate amounts of credit for land preparation , plant-
ing, fertilizer, harvesting, et cetera. Figure 8 gives a sche-
matic representation of the desirable and actual relationship 
between a hypothetical credit cycle of a credit institution, 
the actual credit cycle of the ADB in the Northern and Upper 
regions of Ghana, and the agricultural cycle found among the 
rice farmers in the Northern and Upper reg ions of Ghana. In 
the hypothesized relationship loans would be processed during 
the time that the land was being p~epared for planting. (It 
is assumed here that either no capital expense is incurred 
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Figure 8 . Coordinated cycle of.credi t and agriculture 
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during this period or that land clearing machinery would be 
available). Loan disbursement and supervision is coinciden-
tal with planting, spraying, fertilizer application and cul-
tivating of the crop. The period of loan collection is then 
synchronized with the harvesting and the marketing of the 
crop. 
In the same Figure 8, the more typical situation as wit-
nessed in Northern Ghana is pictured. The period of loan 
processing lasted well into the planting season. Consequently, 
produce was planted late, thereby making the harvesting and 
marketing period incongruent with the collection period . 
Loan disbursement was three months behind schedule. In many 
cases it was found that if loans were received late, the pro-
ceeds were used for direct consumption, since there was no 
income from farming. Many of those who actually attempted to 
plant, had their fields burned ·by bush fires which were tra-
ditionally s et each year as part of hunting game and land 
clearing operations, 
Having looked at the efforts of untimely loan disburse-
ments, the major cause appears to be one which is rather 
typical, when examining the same phenomenon in other develop-
ment situations. The cause was primarily the lack of adequate 
loan processing help (although unavailability of plowing and 
harvesting equipment was the problem at times). 
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b. Provision of close supervision Supervision as far 
as agricultural credit is concerned covers both field or ex-
tension personnel and also supervision on the part of the loan 
officers of the bank. In a previously mentioned study done 
by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Na-
tions (1965), it was concluded that, even if all the various 
prerequisites for the development of agricultural credit were 
fulfilled, the lack of adequate trained staff in credit in-
stitutions and extension services presents a major obstacle 
to the effectiveness of any project to strengthen the credit 
structure (17 , p . 12). This specific conclusion more spec if-
ically embraces the idea of quantity, but the same publica-
tion also brought attention to the idea of the quality of the 
a gricultural bank staff and agricultural extension at all 
levels. 
In reviewing the supervisory capacity in northern Ghana, 
the s ituation had not even advanced to the stage where quality 
became an issue. The previous discussion on the timely dis-
bursement of loans and collection pointed to the extent to 
which the bank loan officers were overworked. The extension 
staff, which in some cases included some of the bank's loan 
officers, did fare much better . A major problem with the 
latter, though besides the lack of personnel, was the fact 
that the a gricultural officers had to travel to the farms, 
whereas in the case of the loan officers, the farmers had to 
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travel to the bank. The remoteness of the two along with the 
quantitative lack of personnel made the provision of close 
supervision almost nil, 
c. Amount of disbursement Agricultural credit may 
be classified according to the purpose for which loans are 
raised, according to the l ength of the loan period, and 
according to the security against which loans are advanced. 
In grouping agricultural loans according to purpose, loans 
to purchase land and standing improvements, to provide per-
manent improvements and to purchase implements, correspond to 
what is known as investment credit. Loans to meet running 
expenses or the marketing of crops correspond to commercial 
credit (7, p, 73). 
Under the ADB group loan schemes, which is the mode of 
lending primarily investigated, only the weeding and harvest-
ing compoment of a loan is g iven in cash. Inkind inputs are 
also a part of the total loan package , but the main consid-
eration here is the cash input. In appraising the amount of 
loan disbursement, as well as other aspects of the ADB's loan-
making procedures, a survey conducted by the author of this 
report, revealed that farmers recognized the insufficiency of 
the loan disbursement as a limiting factor to the ADB lending 
program. A closer examination of the possible uses of credit, 
according to the above classification, tended to throw 
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some doubt on that conclusion. It was found that since op-
erating or '' current expense" loans were the primary objective 
of the ADB's lending package , and since the basic production 
inputs of seed and fertilizer are heavily subsidized in 
Ghana, operating loans for those purposes were not deficient . 
of course, what did appear to be a problem was investment 
credit for the purchase of permanent improvements and large 
machinery . However, since the small farmer cannot efficient-
ly utilize such large improvements, an analysis including the 
investment credit component, can be said to be inapplicable 
to the case at hand. 
7. Analysis of the problem (farm level) 
a. Impact of the Commodity Group Lending Scheme on the 
rice farmers in the Upper region of Ghana The group lend-
ing schemes of the Upper region of Ghana were administered 
by the ADB branch at Bolgatanga (see Figure 2). Of the total 
number of farming groups administered by the bank , only five 
were formed as a rice farming group. Due to the relatively 
smal l number of these groups, a survey of these groups was 
conducted to outl i ne the characteristics of the respective 
groups in the Upper region. The individual groups were the 
Nakapaya group , the So-Wungu group, the Bavognia group , the 
Bru- Navio group, and the Sumbrugu co-operative. 
The Nakapaya group farm had five members, three of which 
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were interviewed. Since each group has a ?POkesman or group 
leader, the group leader was also inc luded. All members of 
the Nakapaya group farm were male and the group had been 
formed in 1974. Excluding the group leader, the mean edu-
cation ~evel attained by the group members was less than a 
complete primary school education. The group leader had com-
pleted secondary school and had some technical school educa-
tion. The mean number of years of farming in general was six 
years. Of this six years the mean number of years of rice 
farming experience was four years. Approximately two-thirds 
of the group had been engaged in rice farming before joining 
the group. Of the group members which had been engaged in 
rice farming before joining the group , the average yield per 
acre before joining the group was approximately sixteen bags 
of paddy per acre. The present yield pe r acre was 28 bags 
per acre. The mean approximate cost of joining the group, in 
the form of personal expenses was 55 cedis (¢1 (1976 ) ~ 
$.87 (1976)). The form of land tenure was leasehold a nd the 
group had access to a tractor and a combine harvester. 
The members of Nakapaya had never applied to the 
ADB for individual loans, but found ADB group lending pro-
cedures easier than commercial banking procedures. The ma-
jority of the group expressed the opinion that they would not 
have been able to obtain credit if ther~ had not been t he 
group credit scheme. The reason given by the members of the 
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group who thought that they would not have been able to obtain 
credit was that the collateral requirement of the local com-
mercial banks could not be met. The group members on the 
average had been able to increase production by acreage ex-
pansion since joining the group. The average increase was 19 
acres. The group had also been able to introduce some modern 
technology into its farming operations because of the access 
to machinery. In having this access, the group as a whole 
was able to effect changes in all phases of its operations, 
from land clearing to transportation of the harvested paddy 
to the rice mill. Probably for obvious reasons, then, it is 
not surprising to find that the members of this group rated 
the success of the Commodity Group Credit Scheme as good . 
The predominant reasons given for this affirmative response 
were financing and expertise. Attention should be brought to 
the fact that the group leader rated the success of the group 
as poor . His reason was that the lack of education and con-
sequently understanding amongst members caused bottlenecks in 
group endeavors at times. The group unanimously showed a 
preference for institutional over non-institutional (money 
lenders , friends and relatives) borrowing. The group also 
thought that two improvements which could be made in the loan 
making procedures were in the areas of allowances for personal 
expenses and the extension of capital equipment loans to 
groups . 
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The individuals in the Nakapaya group marketed their crop 
with the government rice mill, but were generally not satis-
fied with the arrangement. The reasons given fo r this re-
sponse were low prices, delays in payments and delays in 
transport to the mill. Since the individual members had 
joined the group , neither member had been delinquent on his 
loan repayment. 
The So-Wungu group farm had five members, three of which 
were interviewed. The group leader was included in this 
three. The So-Wungu group farm had been formed in 1975 and 
all of its members were male. Excluding the group leader, the 
mean educational level attained by the group members was no 
schooling at all. The group leader had completed secondary 
school. Excluding the group leader, the group members had 
been farming all of their lives. However, they had only been 
rice farmers for one year. The group leader had only been 
farming for one year, and this had been as a rice farmer. 
Since the group was formed in 1975, there was no data on yield 
per acre performance. The major credit source of the individ-
ual members of the group before joining the group was the 
Agricultural Development Bank. The type of land tenure was 
leasehold. The So-Wungu group neither had access to nor owned 
any type of modern machinery. The group members could proba-
bly be characterized as near subsistence. 
The individual members of the So-Wungu group had never 
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applied to the ADB for credit, but found the ADB lending pro-
cedures easier than commercial banking procedures. It was the 
majority opinion of the group that credit would have been 
available even if there had not been the Commodity Group 
Credit Scheme. This same majority listed the ADB as the 
source of individual credit. The group as a whole indicated 
that there had not been any expansion in produc tion since the 
group was f ormed. This might just have been a reflec t ion of 
the recent formation of the group . The group thought that the 
absence of modern technology in farming operations was a pri-
mary obstacle to increases in production. Members of the 
group generally rated the success of the Commodity Group 
Credit Scheme as poor, and cited t he absence of capital fi-
nancing as the main reason for their resultant poor appraisal. 
Institutional rather than non-institutional credit sources 
were preferred by the group. The group's suggested improve-
ment in the ADB loan making procedures was that of the in-
clusion of capital equipment loans. 
The group members marketed their crop through the ADB and 
were satisfied with the arrangement. The group members had 
been delinquent on the loan at least once . The reason was 
that the Ministry of Agriculture's tractor services had 
arrived too late. 
The Bavognia group formed in 1975. During the interview-
ing the group leader was the spokesman for the group. The 
69 
group leader had completed a secondary education. For the 
group as a whole, of an average of twenty years of farming in 
general, fifteen of these years had been devoted to rice farm-
ing. Consequently, the group members had been rice farmers 
before joining the group. The average yield per acre for the 
year just prior to joining the group was ten bags per acre. 
The current yield per acre was twelve bags per acre. There 
was therefore an increase in yield to two bags per acre, since 
joining the group . The main source of financing before join-
ing the group was from personal savings . The average approx-
imate cost of joining the group was ¢60 and the type of tenure 
was leasehold. The group members had access to a tractor and 
combine harvester and individually owned a bullock plough. 
The Bavognia group had generally not applied to the ADB 
for individual loans and would have generally not have been 
able to obtain credit if the Group Credit Scheme had not 
existed. The collateral requirement was listed as the major 
reason why credit could not have been obtained from an alter-
native source. The group members had been able to generally 
increase production since joining t he group . These produc-
tion increases came in the form of yield increases. The mem-
bers were ·also able to introduce some modern technology into 
their operations because of access to the bank's tractor lend-
ing services. The yield increases in production was given as 
the reason for a rating of the success of the Group Credit 
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Scheme as good by the group members. The group members 
expressed a preference of non-institutional over institution-
al borrowing and suggested an increase in the size of the ADB 
loans as an improvement which could be made in ADB loan-making 
procedures. The group members marketed their crop through 
their own effort and generally were satisfied with the 
arrangement. 
The Bru-Navio group had been formed originally in 1972 . 
None of the group members had undergone any form of formal 
education . The general farming background of the group 
members was on the average twenty years, four of which had 
been in rice farming . In the year just prior to joining the 
group, the average yield per acre had been three bags of paddy 
per acre. The current average yield per acre among the mem-
bers was estimated to eight bags per acre. The predominant 
source of credit before joining the group was from personal 
savi ngs , The group members generally owned their own land and 
had access to a tractor and combine harvester, 
The Bru-Navio group members had never applied to the ADB 
for an individual loan, but in having applied for a loan , the 
group members thought that ADB lending procedures were easier 
than commercial borrowing procedures. The group members had 
generally been able to expand production since joining the 
gr oup . The expanded production was in the form of yield 
expansion. The amount of yield increase was five bags per 
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acre. The group had also been able to introduce some modern 
technology into their operations as a direct result of the ADB 
loan. The phases of operations affec ted were in ploughing and 
harvesting, The Bru-Navio group members rated the success of 
the group credit scheme as good. The reason given was that 
there had been an increase in production associated with t he 
receiving of credit. The group also had a preference for 
insti tutional over non-institutional sources of credit. When 
asked about some suggested improvements in the ADB loan making 
procedures, the suggestion of the prompt or timely making of 
loans was made. The group members marketed their crop with 
the government rice mill, but were generally not satisfied 
with the arrangement . The reason given for dissatisfaction 
was the low prices were received for the output . The group 
had, on at least one occasion, been delinquent on their loan. 
This was because fire had destroyed their crop. 
The Sumbrugu group had been formed in 1968. Although the 
majority of the group had no formal education at all, at least 
one member had obtained a night school education. The average 
number of years of farming was t wenty-two, and of t his total 
nine years had been devoted to rice farming . Consequently, the 
group members had generally been rice farmers before joining 
the group . The average yield per acre for the year just prior 
to forming the group was nine bags of paddy per acre. The 
current average yield was three bags of paddy per acre. The 
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members estimated that the cost of joining the group was ¢20 
and also indicated that the type of land tenure was leasehold . 
Although the group had generally not applied to the ADB for 
individual loans, in actually going through the loan process 
as a group, the members were divided on whether the actual 
procedure of loan making used by the ADB was easier. The 
group also had access to a tractor. 
It was the general opinion of the group that the members 
of the Sumbrugu group would not have been able to obtain 
credit if there had not been the Group Credit Scheme . The 
reason was that there would have been an inabili ty to obtain 
credit from other sources because a collateral requirement 
could not be met . The group also felt that their expectations 
of future earnings were not generally predictable and cited 
availability as the obstacle . At least two members of the 
group had been able to increase production by way of acreage 
expansion . The average expansion was two and one-half acres . 
Also the introduction of some modern technology into their 
farming operations in the form of the access to a tractor , had 
affected the areas of ploughing, harrowing, and fertilizer 
application . The group as a whole rated the success of the 
Group Credit Scheme as good , and cited technical assistance 
and machinery access as the reasons for their rating . Insti-
tutional rather than non-institutional credit was the pref-
erence of the group. The group marketed their c rop with the 
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government rice mill and the members were generally satisfied 
with the arrangement. The group had never been delinquent on 
its loan. 
b, Summary and conclusions of the impact of credit on 
the rice farming groups of the Upper region of Ghana In 
assessing the performance of rice groups in the Upper reg i on 
of Ghana, the Nakapaya group appears to have been the most 
successful. In assessing the dominant reasons for this 
group ' s success over the others, several aspects stand out . 
Probably the most prominent aspect was internal organization. 
The Nakapaya group leader had been a technical officer and had 
received a secondary education . Even the group members we re 
aware of the impact of the group leader's expertise on the 
successful performance of the group. Interestingly enough 
though, the group leader expressed the opinion that the 
succ ess of the Group Credit Scheme was poor , and the reason 
given was that there was a general lack of education among the 
group members which brought about failures in farm operations . 
Beyond the issues of technical expertise and education, the 
Naka paya group leader owned a tractor himself and therefore 
did not have to depend on the Ministry's tractor lending 
services, which came too late . In having access to the tech-
nology, the Nakapaya group was able to affect all areas of its 
operations from land clearing to transport to the mill. 
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In assessing the impact of credit on the groups in gen-
eral, probably one of the more interesting responses was that 
in no case had any of the group members ever applied to the 
ADB for individual loans. In two of the five groups . it was 
expressed that there would have been an ability to obtain 
credit even if there had not been the Group Credit Scheme. 
Four out of five groups indicated that their main source of 
f inance before joining the group was through their own savings. 
Four of the five groups had been able to expand production 
since forming the group and in the case of the group which 
could not expand production, the reason given was that the 
technology was not readily available. Institutional as 
opposed to non-institutional borrowing was the unanimous pref-
erence among groups and the suggested improvements in the ADB 
loan making procedures, as expressed by the respective groups 
were the extension of loans to cover personal expenses, the 
extension of capital equipment loans, improved technology 
availability in the form of tractor, and prompt loan making. 
Two of the five groups had at one time been delinquent on their 
loans. In one case tractor services had been received too late 
and in the other case a fire had destroyed the crop . In con-
c lusion, the most dominant factors in the success of rice farm-
ing groups in the Upper region of Ghana were education, tech-
nical expertise, mechanization and prompt loan making. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS ON AGRICULTURAL CREDIT IN GHANA 
A. Summary on Agricultural Credit in Ghana 
A more pressing obstac le to the establishment of a sound 
agricultural credit program in Ghana is that of loan repay-
ment. Various country case studies of the phenomenon have 
linked the cause of loan repayment problems with the disecon-
omies of scale associated with the expansion of credit 
accessibility. Current analyses of the problem by government 
planners stress farm level causes as the primary contributors 
to the problem. Readings of the subjec t of project planning 
in developing countries have pointed to errors in planning 
assumptions and operation assumptions as a typical cause of 
the limited success achieved by development projects . In 
furthering the analysis, a list of the aims of a good agricul-
tural credit system were evaluated, using the Agricultural 
development Bank of Ghana. Attention was brought to access -
i bility of credit, the cos t of cr edit, the reduction of ris k 
and the terms of loans. 
A graphical analysis of the operations of the ADB over 
time , tended to support the case study observations of loan 
repayment . As the agricultural credit program reached more 
borrowers, loan repayment began to decrease. Credit was 
access i ole in each region of the country, but discrimination 
against residents of the more remote areas did exist. Access-
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ibility, in the form of goals did exist, in that geographic 
expansion was a major objective of the ADB. After initiating 
a recent increase in the interest rate on agricultural loans, 
the costs of credit to agricultural borrowers has been brought 
into line with other forms of credit extended by the ADB. The 
reduction of risks to the borrower came in the areas of tech-
nical risk reduction and commercial risk reduction. Technical 
risk reduction was limited by insufficent transport facilities 
and extension staff. Prices obtained for produce were also 
lower than those which could be obtained from sources other 
than the government. Commercial risk reduction attempts took 
the form of the establishment of minimum prices by the govern-
ment. Although this provided some price stability, farmers in 
the area viewed the prices as being too low. Reduction of 
risk to the ADB itself, mainly came as a result of the Commod-
ity Group Credit Scheme. The major form of risk reduction to 
the ADB was in the area of security for the loan, the provi-
sion for repayment, and the pooling of risk. Attention was 
brought to timely disbursement of loans and collections, pro-
vision of close supervision, follow-up work to ensure repay-
ment, and the amount of disbursement. The first three areas 
were found to be suboptimal with the major cause being the 
lack of proper staff. The amount of disbursement was found to 
be appropriate for production expenses only. 
The conclusions reached from the analysis in this paper 
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primarily have implications for policy. Currently there is 
the tendency for project designers in Ghana to proceed on in-
tuition , which is probably a significant element in explaining 
the over expansion of credit, which had led to loan repayment 
problems . Littl e or no consideration was given to socio-eco-
nomic and cultur a l variables. To aggravate conditions even 
more , there were no feed-back mechanisms, making one wonder 
how a systematic solution could ultimately be reached. 
B. Prospects for Additional Research 
As is probably most vividly exemplified by this study, 
data for the statistical analysis of loan repayment problems 
in Ghana are virt ually non-existent . Consequently , any pros -
pects for addi t ional research into the area of loan repayment , 
must consider da ta gathering as a prerequisite to any approach 
to the problem . Therefore, one area into which additional re -
search is needed is the area of agricultural credit itself, 
but note should be taken of the urgency of an · integrated and 
comprehensive approach to the problem. A Food and Agriculture 
Organization study , in 1965, stated the conclusion that "it is 
impossible to s olve the credit problem in any deve l oping 
country without t ackling, at the same time , marketing and 
supply" (18 , p . 162) . There are of course , other areas which 
need investigation , but the most urgent area in the field of 
agriculture is the area of credit, along with agricultural 
marketing and supply. 
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Table 17. Sumbrugu Rice Group General Demographies 
(Consensus Response) 
1 • Sex of group members 
2. Year group formed 
3. Number of years of education (excluding group 
lead era 
4. Number of years of education of group leaderb 
s. Number of years as a farmer 
6. Numbe r of years as a farmer (rice) 
7. Yie l d per acre for the year prior to group 
forma t ion 
9 bags 
male 
1.2R 
J.. 
~ 
22 
.-2 
of J2add;y: 
8. Current yield per acre 3 bags of padd;y: 
9. Average approximate cost of joining the group ~ 
10. Type of land tenure leasehold 
11. Equipment which the group had access to tractor 
al = no schooling at all. 
b4 = at least a secondary education. 
87 
Table 18 . Sumbrugu Rice Group Credit Impact Demographies 
(Consensus) 
1. Ever applied to the ADB for an individual loan no 
2 . Other sources of credit no 
3. Major obstacle to obtaining credit (if any) collateral 
4 . Increase in pr oduction since joining the group ~ 
5. Average increase in production (if any) 
Increases in acreages 
6. 
7. 
Changes effected in phases of farm operations 
Rating of the success of the Group Credit Scheme 
8 . Reasons given for rating of Group Credit Scheme 
technical assistance, machinery access 
9. Preferences for institutional vs. non-insti-
tutional borrowing institutional 
10. Suggested improvements in the ADB loan-making 
procedures 
11 . Method of marketing crop government rice mill 
12 . Satisfaction with the marketing arrangement 
13. Reason for dissatisfaction (if any) 
14. Loan ever delinquent 
15 . Reason (if any) 
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Tabl e 19. Bru- Navio Rice Group General Demographies 
(Consensus Response) 
1. Sex of group members 
2. Year group formed 
J . Number of 
leader) 
years of education (excluding groupa 
4. Number of years of education of group leadera 
5. Number of years as a farmer 
6 . Number of years as a rice farmer 
7. Yield per acre for the year prior to group 
formation 
3 bags 
male 
1-21£ 
-1 
_!_ 
20 
4 
of padd:i 
8 . Cur rent yie l d per acre 8 bags of padd:i 
9. Ave r age appr oximat e cost of joining t he group 
no response 
10 . Type of l a nd tenure private ownership 
11 . Equipment which the group had access to 
al = no schooling at all. 
tractor and 
combine harveste r 
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Table 20. Bru-Navio Rice Group Credit Impact Demographies 
(Consensus Response) 
1. Ever applied to the ADB for an individual loan 
2. Other sources of credit 
J. Major obstacle to obtaining credit (if any) 
4. Increase in production since joining the group 
5. Average increase in production (if any) 
6. 
7. 
5 bags of paddy 
Changes effected in phases of farm operations 
Rating of the success of the Group Credit Scheme 
8 . Reasons given for rating of Group Credit Scheme 
Increase in production 
9. Preferences for institutional vs. non-insti-
tutional borrowing institutional 
10. Suggested improvements in the ADB loan-making 
procedures timely loan-making 
11. Method of marketing crop government rice mill 
12. Satisfaction with the marketing arrangement !!.Q. 
13. Reason for dissatisfaction (if any) low prices 
14. Loan ever delinquent ~ 
15 . Reason (if any) fire destroyed crop 
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Table 21 . Bavognia Rice Group Demographies (Consensus 
Response) 
1. Sex of group members male 
2 . Year group formed 121.i 
3. Number of years of education (excluding group 1 
leader 
4. Number of years of education of group leader 4 
5. Number of years as a farmer 20 
6 . Number of years as a farmer (rice) 1.5. 
? . Yield per acre for the year prior to group 
formation 
10 bags of 12add;t 
8 . Current yield per acre 12 bags of paddy 
9 . Average approximate cost of joining the group ¢60 
10. Type of land tenure leasehold 
11 . Equipment which the group had access to 
a1 = no schooling. 
b4 = completed secondary school. 
tractor and 
combine 
haryester 
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Table 22. Bavognia Rice Group Credit Impact Demographies 
(Consensus Response) 
1. Ever applied to the ADB for an individual loan no 
2. Other sources of credit no 
3. Major obstacle to obtaining credit (if any) collateral 
4. Increase in production since joining the group ~ 
5. Average increase in production (if any) 
2 bags of paddy per acre 
Changes effected in phases of farm operations 6. 
7. Rating of the success of the Group Credit Scheme 
8 . Reasons given for rating of Group Credit Scheme 
Increase in production 
9. Preferences for institutional vs. non-insti -
tutional borrowing institutional 
10. Suggested improvements in the ADB loan-making 
pr ocedures larger loans 
11 . Method of marketing crop own effort 
12. Satisfacti on with the marketing arrangement 
13. Reason for dissatisfaction (if any) 
14 . Loan ever delinquent no 
15 . Reason (if any) 
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Table 23. So-Wungo Rice Group Demographies (Consensus 
Response) 
1. Sex of group male 
2. Year group formed 1.21.5. 
.3. Number of years of education excluding group 
lead era 1 
4. Number of years of education of group leaderb !± 
5. Number of years as a farmer lifetime 
6. Number of years as a farmer (rice) 1 
?. Yield per acre for 
format i on 
the year prior to group 
no response 
8 . Current yield pe r acre no response 
9. Average approximate cost of joining the group 
10. Type of land tenure 
11. Equipment which the group had access to 
al = no schooling at all. 
h4 = completed secondary school. 
no response 
leasehold 
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Table 24. So-Wungo Rice Group Credit Impact Demographies 
(Consensus Response) 
1. 
2. 
3, 
4, 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Ever applied to the ADB for an individual loan 
Other sources of credit 
Major obstacle to obtaining credit (if any) 
Increase in production since joining the group 
Average increase in production (if any) 
Changes effected in phases of farm operations 
Rating of the success of the Group Credit Scheme 
8, Reasons given for rating of Group Credit Scheme 
no 
none 
lack of capital , eguipment financing 
9. Preferences for institutional vs. non-insti-
tutional borrowing institutional 
10, Suggested improvements in the ADB loan-making 
procedures 
inclusion of capital eguipment loans 
11 . Method of marketing crop through ADB 
12, Satisfaction with the marketing arrangement ~ 
13. Reason for dissatisfaction (if any) N/A 
14. Loan ever delinquent ~ 
15. Reason (if any) tractor services arrived too late 
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Table 25. Nakapaya Rice Group General Demographies 
(Consensus Response) 
1. Sex of group members 
2. Year group formed 
J . Number of years of education (excluding group 
leader)a 
4. Number of years of education of group leaderb 
5. Number of years as a farmer 
6. Number of years as a farmer (rice) 
7. Yield per acre for 
formation 
the year prior to group 
2 
4 
6 
!± 
8 . Current yield per acre 
16 bags of paddy 
28 bags of paddy 
9. Average approximate cost of joining the group [22 
10 . Type of land tenure leasehold 
11. Equipment which the group had access to 
tractor and 
combine harvester 
a2 = less than a complete primary education. 
b4 = completed secondary school . 
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Table 26 . Nakapaya Rice Gro~p Credit Impact Demographies 
(Consensus Response) 
1. Ever applied to the ADB for an individual loan no 
2. Other sources of credit no 
3. Major obstacle to obtaining credit (if any) collateral 
4. Increase in production since joining the group ~ 
5. Average increase in production (if any) 
acreage expansion of 19 acres 
6. 
?. 
Changes effected in phases of farm operations 
Rating of the success of the Group Credit Scheme 
8. Reasons given for rating of Group Credit Scheme 
financing ex pertise 
9 . Preferences for institutional vs. non-insti-
tutional institutional 
10. Suggested improvements in the ADB loan- making 
procedures allowances for personal expenses 
and capital equipment loans 
11 . Method of marketing crop government rice mill 
12 . Satisfaction with the marketing arrangement 
13 . Reason for dissatisfaction (if any) 
14. Loan ever delinquent 
15. Reason(if any) 
low prices 
delays in payments 
!lQ. 
N/A 
